CO129-382 - Public Offices - 1911 — Page 356

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towards the Chinese Government, and to the advantages obtained by the two con- tracting parties. That the agreement has immensly strengthened the hands of Russia and Japan vis-à-vis China will, I think, at once be admitted; but a recapitulation of recent events will, perhaps, be useful in order to give due prominence to particular effects. The American proposal for the internationalisation of the Manchurian railways has not materialised; the scheme for the construction of the Chinchou- Aigun Railway has, as far as one can ascertain locally, made no progress; the Japanese have entered into full possession of Corea; the Russians have compelled the Chinese Government to yield to all their contentions of material importance in respect to the navigation of the Sungari, and have claimed, and will probably obtain, a modification of the Aigun regulations in accordance with the principles enunciated in the Sungari regulations; the Russians have, at least so far, refused to admit the right of Chinese steamers to navigate the Amur; the Russians, according to the information which I have, intend to do their utmost at the coming negotiations in connection with the revision of the Russo-Chinese treaty of 1881 to maintain and strengthen their existing trading privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia; the Russians are endeavour- ing to bring within their own territory the railway settlement at Manchuria; the Japanese, according to Chinese reports, are insisting upon a fresh delimitation of the Sino-Corean frontier bordering on the Autung or Tung-pien circuit, and, lastly, the Russians and Japanese have concluded railway agreements for the conveyance of goods and passengers, which, though not exhibiting a perfect accord, are evidence of a considerable improvement, temporary though it may be, in their mutual relations. The benefits obtained by the Russians and Japanese are, it is manifest, of no small consequence, and the fear that Manchuria will eventually be divided between Russia and Japan has been expressed by many. That there are disturbing factors in the situation which may force the Russians and Japanese to take stronger measures to safeguard their existing interests, and may compel them to decide upon a line of action which may not now be definitely resolved, is not be be denied, and a few brief remarks in connection with them may be desirable.

The matters which occur to my mind are the inefficiency and ineptitude of the Chinese officials, the effort which these authorities are reported to be making to obtain an American loan for the development of Manchuria, and the presence and growth in the numbers of bandits and desperadoes commonly called Hung Hu Tzus. In speaking of the inefficiency and ineptitude of the Chinese authorities, I have not the intention to paint them blacker than they are, since it must be allowed that they are at the present moment in the position of being between two fires, or, as it is sometimes less At the same time, they euphemistically put, between the devil and the deep sea.

are themselves largely responsible for the straits to which they are reduced, and I can say without hesitation that in not one single case concerning which I have personally been brought into communication with the local officials have they approached the matter in a proper manner. It has been necessary to compel them to do the right thing by convincing them that nothing else would do. Fortunately for my peace of mind the cases have not been many. It is, of course, a fact that the Chinese authorities are in need of funds, but even if the money should be forthcoming, it is safe to say that much of it would be misused, and I cannot but think that the danger of a specific loan for Manchuria, more particularly if it is associated with Chinese railway enterprise, is that it will encourage the Russians and Japanese to take further steps to consolidate their present position in the province. As regards the Hung Hu Tzus, it is admitted on all sides that their numbers are very great, and the opinion of a Chinaman who knows the province is that in Kirin and Heilung- chiang only half the population is respectable, the remainder being of the criminal class. The term "Hung Hu Tzu" in Manchuria is generally applied to robbers of all kinds, and not merely to banditti who move about in bands and dwell in encamp- ments. Roving bands of this description appear to be sufficiently numerous, and one was seen between Bodune (Petuna) and Taolaichao by the members of the Imperial Maritime Customs survey party, concerning which I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 32 of the 24th September.

At least three descents upon timber concessions worked by Russians have during the past summer been made by these desperadoes, who endeavour to levy toll upon the owners, and have caused considerable damage by fire, the loss in one instance with being said to be 160,000 rupees. The Chinese authorities seem powerless to cope these bandits, and I gather from my Russian colleague that the report which bas recently appeared in the local Russian press, to the effect that M. Korostovetz has informed the Wai-wu Pu that, if the local Chinese authorities are not able to check

the evil, Russian troops will take the matter in hand and go in pursuit of the robbers outside the limits of the railway territory, is correct. It does not appear that the energies of the Russian military have in the past been entirely confined to the railway territory, as they have military posts at Sansing, Bodune, Lahasusu, Hsin Tien, and other places where there are agents of the Chinese Eastern railway, or the Russians have commercial interests--at the same time, a definite and official state- ment to the Central Government, such as that attributed to the Russian Minister, seems to imply that the Russians are prepared to take more active steps should the necessity arise. Other recent examples of the desperate character of these Hung Hu Tzus, who, as above intimated, and as there seems good reason to fear, may at any time when the occasion suits, and in default of other grounds, give the Russian or Japanese authorities a cause for active interference, are an armed attack upon a river steamer in September, and two shooting affrays in the New Town of Harbin during the same month. The first was much of the nature of the Canton River piracies: the Russian captain and the Russian engineer were killed, the machinery of the ship was disabled, the crew and passengers were overawed, deprived of their money and valuables, and driven down into the holds, and the attack was prearranged by the cook of the vessel and a confederate, a former "chef," who was the leader of the band which perpetrated the deed. The shooting affrays, one of which I witnessed, as it occurred in front of the consulate, occurred in broad daylight, the flung Hu Tzus who were being pursued by police defending themselves with revolvers, which they discharged freely, and in one case with mortal effect. So far as I can learn from my Russian colleague, no compensation has been obtainable from the Chinese authorities for the damage done to the Russian timber concessions, and the fact that it seems to be impossible to obtain reparation for the injury caused by the depredations of these desperadoes would appear to still further justify the apprehension already expressed that, if matters do not improve, the opportunity will be given to the Japanese or Russian authorities, as the case may be, to themselves take active measures.

In the earlier portion of this despatch, I referred to the danger which threatens the Russians from the superior energy and thoroughness and, I may now add, more united efforts of the Japanese-it follows of itself that as a power in Manchuria the Japanese are the more to be feared. I am not disposed to think that the former now underrate the abilities of the latter, and the question, in so far as the two nationalities are individually concerned, is whether the Russians will be able to develop sufficient continued energy to prove themselves the equal of the Japanese. There is ample room for doubt.

I have, &c.

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H. E. SLY.

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